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As an extension of gentrification, high quality education-driven jiaoyufication not 
only displaces previous lower class as jiaoyufiers, but also replaces former 
jiaoyufiers with newcomers, as well as blenching former blue collar 
neighborhoods. New middle class communities are emerging as spatially 
limited education-apartment zones attract social groups who attempt to occupy 
these spaces to facilitate social mobility and consolidation, causing tension 
between them. Consequently, jiaoyufication has narrowed down opportunities 
for intra-generation-based social mobility and exacerbated social polarization, 
gradually replacing traditional social hierarchies with an intergeneration-based 
neoliberal stratification.  
 





Unprecedented rapid neoliberal urbanization in the China reform era has 
stimulated a series of substantive and complicated social, economic and spatial 
transitions. Among them, the form of gentrification - what Smith (2002: 427) 
articulates as a ‘sporadic, quaint and local anomaly’ – has taken on unique 
forms within a particular strategy of capitalist production-based, revanchist 
urbanization.  Jiaoyufication, originating from the Chinese word of ‘Jiaoyu’, 
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translated as ‘education’ in English, reflects a newly constructed space in 
Chinese cities (refer to Wu et al., 2016a; Wu et al., 2016b for detailed 
explanation). ‘Jiaoyu’ refers mainly to primary and secondary schools in this 
paper. More specifically, jiaoyufication centres upon the acquisition of 
apartments within the urban catchment areas of prestigious primary and 
secondary schools. When jiaoyufiers, who demand high-quality educational 
resources move into these inner city areas, they not only displace the lower 
class (Newman and Wyly, 2006; Forrest, 2015) but also replace the former 
jiaoyufiers (Wu et al., 2016b). This inner city gentrification transition process 
has been a primarily market-driven force in contrast to state-dominated urban 
redevelopment through a process of formalization (Wu, 2016).  Consequently, 
new middle class communities emerge through the (re)production of social 
space (Lefebvre, 1991). As with conventional processes of gentrification, these 
spaces foster middle class spaces and identities through jiaoyufication-based 
cultural (re)production (Willis, 1981; Wu et al., 2016a). As an extension of 
gentrification, the process of jiaoyufication is characterized by middle class 
strategies to claim educational advantages (Wu et al, 2014). As an education-
led, social capital-based form of gentrification distinct from the property-led 
gentrification that has been used as an urban strategy of Chinese neoliberal 
urbanization (Wu, 2016a), jiaoyufication introduces educational/social capital 
into the kind of economy-based gentrification process theorized by Smith (Wu 
et al., 2016b).  
 
In the context of jiaoyufication, there has been an evolving strategic ‘battle’ over 
space as part of the process of middle class remaking. Social tension suffused 
the social-spatial relationships between classes as they fought for high quality 
educational resources during the initial stages of China’s urban restructuring. 
This has subsequently led to further contestation around social consolidation 
and class mobility. On one hand, in order to be close to the upper class and 
maintain their status (Wilson and Schulz, 1978), jiaoyufiers, as members of the 
urban middle class, seek to demonstrate their superiority through cultural 
reproduction and distinguishing themselves from other social classes. On the 
other hand, members of the lower-middle class are eager to challenge the 
existent social-hierarchy and penetrate the higher echelons of the middle class. 
In this sense, the lower-middle class is a ‘sandwich’ stratum that seeks to 
maintain social position while looking for ways to attain higher status. In a 
reformed, (post)industrialized China, limited high quality educational resources 
offered by the most prestigious schools have become a pivotal focus in the 
battle for increasing social mobility and class consolidation for middle and lower 
social groups (Breen and Karlson, 2014; Magnani and Zhu, 2015).  
 
The battle over cultural reproduction has been further intensified by 
jiaoyufication in a geographical sense, extending privilege-based socio-
economic competition to particular spaces (Lefebvre, 1991). As Wu et al (2015) 
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articulate, jiaoyufication refers to an interweaving process in which lower class 
residents are displaced by middle class jiaoyufiers and in the resultant urban 
enclaves, these pioneers have been replaced by peer successors. 
Jiaoyufication is thus a transitional process from gentrification to residential 
segregation that is not subject to reversal. Both high-quality educational 
resources and residential properties within jiaoyufication zones are limited. 
Accordingly, middle class anxiety about the loss of social status (Ehrenreich, 
1990) generates an intensified battle over limited educational resources and 
scarce spatial resources. This is resulting in an emergent form of spatial 
distinction that signifies a change from differentiation based on privileged-based 
education to territorially-based distinction (McDowell et al., 2006; Wu et al., 
2015; Soja, 1996), exacerbating social segregation. 
 
These tensions over social and spatial (re)production have amplified intense 
competitions between the urban new rich (Li, 2003; Wu et al., 2014), the 
traditional middle class and upper fractions of the blue collar class (Wilson and 
Schulz, 1978). Among these contenders, the urban new rich who have emerged 
in the reform era are most eager to become assimilated into middle or upper 
strata. This distinctive class, who possessed less cultural capital in the pre-
reform era, have benefited from a great increase in economic capital in the era 
of market reform.  
 
In further exploring these forms of class remaking and contestation, the 
remainder of this paper consists of four sections. The first reviews the literature 
on jiaoyufication and draws implications about China’s urban developments. 
The second section discusses how in-depth interviews have been utilized to 
illustrate how class struggle is embedded in the practice of jiaoyufication. By re-
visiting the existing literature and evaluating empirical findings, the third section 
elaborates upon how limited access to scarce educational resources provokes 
strategies to seek social mobility and status consolidation that intensify class 
relations. The final section elucidates upon the implications of revealing a new 
form of social-spatial segregation within a revanchist urbanism in China. 
 
Understanding Jiaoyufication within the context of space and cultural 
(re)production  
 
Initially, conceptions of gentrification accounted for the process through which 
older residential buildings in inner-city communities were rehabilitated and 
working-class occupants displaced by richer middle-class incomers (Hamnett, 
1991). However, as Smith (1996) contends, gentrification more broadly refers 
to the (middle) class remaking of urban (and rural) spaces, a process through 
which its forms mutate according to the spatio-temporal contexts in which they 
occur. Subsequently, research has increasingly reflected the acceleration and 
diversification of urban restructuring, as well as the increasing size and diversity 
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of middle classes around the world. Accordingly, an understanding of what 
constitutes gentrification has expanded to encompass broader processes 
through which former residents are displaced, class conversion within 
neighborhoods occurs, properties are upgraded, and rent gaps are exploited 
for profit making purposes (Lees et al., 2008).  
 
A diverse range of educational and cultural theories have endeavored to 
explicate these urban transformations of class and space. In drawing on 
Bourdieu’s (1984) theories of distinction, Bridge (2001) points out that 
gentrification exemplifies strategies of social and cultural reproduction through 
the performance of a middle class habitus in redeveloped areas of the inner city. 
Home-making, design, cultural and consumption oriented practices reproduce 
both place and class. As such, these gentrified communities thereby delineate 
and reproduce daily urban practices that undergird structuralized rules and 
resources (Giddens, 1984). They can be considered as forms of cultural 
(re)production that contribute to social reproduction and act to sanctify these 
communities as sites of middle class remaking that also reproduce social space 
(Smith, 1996; Lefebvre, 1991). 
 
In China, children can enroll at a nearly public school to receive a nine-year 
compulsory education (from primary to junior secondary school), based on the 
hukou registration that is linked with the property of their parents. This institution 
was enacted to ensure the fairness of education. However, the quality of 
educational resources between regions has been spatially differentiated (for 
instance, between rural and urban, or coastal and inland realms) and locations 
(city centre and urban fringe) (Hannum and Wang, 2006). Subsequently, 
students have been allowed to enroll in a better school in another district by 
paying a school choice fee (Tsang, 2000; Whitty, 1997). This policy has 
stimulated the formation of Xuequ buildings (Figure 1), which are located within 
the catchment area of key schools. This process is called jiaoyufication (Wu el 
al., 2015; Wu et al., 2014).  
  
 
Since the early 2000s, as a recent extension of education-led gentrification 
manifest in Chinese inner cities, jiaoyufication has revealed the colonization of 
school catchment areas by the professional and managerial classes. Through 
such strategies, middle class families try to achieve upward mobility and cultural 
(re)production by securing limited housing located in key school catchment 
areas. This represents two threads: space making and class making (Smith, 
1986).  
 
The first thread is that Jiaoyufication has generated and enhanced residential 
segregation through distinguishing key edu-apartment communities from other 
neighborhoods (Wu et al., 2015; Rowe, 2014). During the initial stages of 
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Jiaoyufication, this inevitably displaced low class inhabitants (Rose, 2013), 
primarily the blue-collar workers of former state-owned (SOEs) and collective-
owner enterprises (COEs) in the planned economy era (Wu and Webster, 2010). 
Accordingly, the coexistence of different social groups within the catchments of 
prestigious schools has gradually been replaced by internal middle class 
homogeneity (McDowell et al., 2006). Because the initial displacement of lower 
class residents in these edu-apartments has been supplanted by the 
replacement of jiaoyufiers with newcomers of a similar class, Jiaoyufication 
demonstrates unique characteristics of reversal neighborhood filter, contrasting 
with situations in which upwardly mobile residents depart an inner-city 
neighbourhood and leave poorer neighbours behind, thereby degrading the 
status and quality of the area (Hedin et al., 2012). Instead, segregation is 
produced through the prevention of lower class people from returning to the 
areas (Fig 1. For instance, Wu et al. (2016a) reveals that through jiaoyufication 
processes in the inner city of Nanjing, wealthy jiaoyufied families displaced the 
original lower class families in key schools’ catchment areas and acted as the 
door-keepers of the housing market in resisting lower class penetration, 
consequently reinforcing residential segregation. 
 
 
Figure 1 Displacement and replacement in the production of Jiaoyufied space; figure 
devised by Jianquan Cheng and Qiyan Wu 
 
The second thread is that jiaoyufication gives rise to social reproduction through 
cultural reproduction, resulting in class remaking (Fig 1). Through daily 
practices and routines of cultural production emerging from particular 
expressions of middle class habitus (Bourdieu, 1984; 1991), an ongoing 
process of class-making unfolds. Sites such as coffee shops and tea bars serve 
as venues for new and traditional consumption practices respectively, 
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highlighting the distinctive differences that such practices might express. The 
social consequences of these endeavors to reproduce cultural capital may 
result in the consolidation of the intergenerational social status of middle class 
families (Robson and Butler, 2001). But it may also provoke inter-generational 
or intra-generational upward social mobility that is pursued by lower class and 
newly rich families with lower social and cultural capital than existing jiaoyufiers 
(Brown et al., 2013). Accordingly, jiaoyufication is more concerned with social 
class reproduction through territory-based cultural production within the 
catchment area of “good” schools. By contrast, other sociological studies in 
China solely focus on the reproduction of middle class identity through 
intergenerational cultural reproduction or everyday practice within the social 
hemisphere (Tomba, 2004)).  Consequently, the territory-based displacement 
wrought by jiaoyufication stirs class tension more profoundly than other middle 
class remaking processes, since, for example, the rights of the lower classes 
to receive a good education have been deprived as middle-class families have 
extensively competed with each other for limited educational opportunities. 
 
Because of an ongoing battle over scarce educational resources and limited 
residential space, inter-individual and inter-group tensions are inevitable. These 
strategies for middle class remaking further enhance and intensify the restless 
social conflict that is emerging in the transition era of urban China (Logan, 2008; 
Chan, 1996; Nee, 1996; Bian, 2002; Bian, et al., 2005). Indeed, there are at 
least three social groups involved in the battle for edu-apartments - the new 
rich, professionals and intellectuals, and bureaucrats - who possess different 
levels of power, authority and fortune. 
 
The new rich accumulated large fortunes during the process of market transition 
(Goodman and Zang, 2008). However, they tend to lack the manners and 
language use that express the cultural capital of middle and upper class people 
and are applied to secure educational advantages for themselves and their 
children (Bourdieu, 1991; Nash, 1990). In popular culture, they are frequently 
labelled as nouveau-riche parvenus who behave improperly even though they 
may be dressed in expensive clothes and drive luxury cars (Pinches, 1999). 
Such stereotyping has recently extended to internet slang through which they 
are identified as tuhao (土豪), BMW (wo)man (宝马男（女）amongst other 
epithets. The former connotes those whose new wealth is accompanied by rude 
and impolite behavior, while the latter refers to the ostentatious display of wealth 
through car ownership. Even if the new rich own substantial economic capital 
they may not be regarded as orthodox members of the middle or upper class. 
As such, they have strong motives to seek a good education for their children 
so that they may be granted the cultural reproduction for which they are eager 
and become assimilated into mainstream middle class society (Lan, 2014; 
Baltzell, 2011). Since these new rich tend to possess more financial capital than 
their peers in bidding for the scarce edu-apartments within the key school 
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catchments, they aggravate the tense relations generated by the battle over 
core educational resources in the urban housing market.  
 
While professionals or intellectuals are rich in cultural capital (Gramsci, 2005), 
they own less economic capital and thus rely more on cultural reproduction for 
class consolidation and increased social mobility (Wilson and Schulz, 1978; 
Baltzell, 2011; Power et al., 2003). Meanwhile, middle ranking bureaucrats are 
normally bestowed with more political capital through the sophisticated use of 
institutional arrangements than other social groups in the battle for edu-
apartments, as well as having greater access to high-quality educational 
resources. 
 
Undoubtedly, jiaoyufication has contributed to cultural reproduction based class 
restructuring in urban China through educational accessibility. This may unlock 
the path-dependence of social hierarchy based social segregation, and add to 
or gradually replace it with a territory-based segregation based on middle class 
remaking through jiaoyufied space production. The methods and case studies 
in the follow-up sessions aim to understand the social interactions shaping the 
pattern of jiaoyufication using quantitative and qualitative ways. 
 
Methods and case studies 
 
Although Nanjing has been downgraded to the status of a regional city since 
1949, it remains a national center for science, technology and education. It not 
only has 54 universities, over 800,000 college students and 2.61 million 
residents with college degree or above (31.89% of total registered population, 
NSB, 2014), but also is reputed to be one of the most advanced cities in pre-
higher education (primary and secondary educations) across China. As such, 
Nanjing is an ideal site to study jiaoyufication as part of China’s current culture-







       Figure 2. Location of case study area (and selected key schools) 
Photographs by Qiyan Wu 
 
This study involves a hybrid research approach of mixed qualitative and 
quantitative methods. On one hand, a wide range of materials were drawn from 
interviews and participant observation carried out between 2012 and 2015. 
Extensive interviews with 37 people were conducted with the following 
participants: (1) six teachers with different roles, from school principal to general 
tutor; (2) two officials in municipal and district educational bureaus; (3) ten 
parents with different occupations and professions, whose children had entered 
supposedly key schools or had planned to do so; (4) seven real estate agents 
with different positions (from deputy general manager to low level manager) in 
different agencies (from national chain real estate companies to local family 
companies); (5) two social researchers in higher educational institutions; and 
(6) ten property owners of edu-apartments and non-edu-apartments. These in-
depth interviews were conducted in edu-apartment zones to reveal the process 
of education-driven space (re)production. The study has also explored the 
potential tensions in the real estate market and residential zones among 
different social groups, who practice educational strategies of class production, 
both consciously and unconsciously (Bourdieu 1984), and subsequently 
occupied edu-apartments around key schools and consolidated the class 





In addition, a web-based stratified sampling questionnaire survey (McAfee and 
Brynjolfsson, 2012; Loehlin, 1998) was conducted between 2014 and 2015 that 
involved 1233 college graduates aged 18-35 (see the details in the appendix), 
followed by occasional face-to-face interviews with fifteen participants 
subsequently selected from these. This data was then used to develop two 
structural equation models (SEM) using the statistics analysis software 
package (AMOS v22 – Analysis of Moment Structures) 
(http://www.statisticssolutions.com/amos/), which aims to reveal the causal and 
path relationships between pre-higher education, educational attainment and 
living conditions. SEM, as a relatively new method of modelling and a specific 
type of econometric analysis, mixes confirmatory factor analysis, path analysis 
and regression analysis, so can explain the structural relationships between 
multiple dependent and independent variables. The variables are split into two 
categories: measurable or latent (not observable) variable, and exogenous or 
endogenous variable. A latent variable or construct (e.g. compulsory education) 
is usually defined and quantified by measurable or observable variables (e.g. 
primary school). In contrast to endogenous variable, an exogenous variable is 
not affected by models but determined by factors outside of the models.  
 
Compared with the ordinary least-square (OLS) regression model, the SEM 
model, estimated by using maximum likelihood method, is less sensitive to 
multicollinearity, assumption of normal distribution and measurement error. The 
popular statistics Chi-square is sensitive to sample size. Thereby, several other 
indices are frequently used for judging goodness-of-fit from varied perspectives 
(e.g. Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), NFI, IFI, PGFI, 
and PNFI).  
 
SEM method usually outputs two types of models: measurement and structural 
models. A measurement model shows the relationships between a latent 
construct and its indicators. A structural model imputes causal dependencies 
(relationships) between latent constructs. A typical output of SEM model is a 
path diagram, the part of structural models. In the diagram, ovals indicate latent 
constructs and rectangles for observable variables. The true circle is the error 
term and its value means how error influence an observed variable. Arrows with 
single sides show path regression indicating the strength of the relationship and 
arrows with both sides show covariance.  The path diagram can be used to 
analyze various effects between latent constructs. SEM makes a distinction 
between direct, indirect and total effect which one latent construct has on 
another. Direct effect is the link going directly from one variable to another. 
Indirect effect occur between two variables, mediated by one or more 
intervening variables. Total effect is the sum of direct and indirect effects, 
representing overall effect. These will provide more accurate statistics in 
estimating causal relationships. Another strength of SEM is that nonparametric 
SEM permits the estimation of the three effects without making any commitment 
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to the form of the equations or to the distribution of the error terms. This has 
made SEM method particularly useful for modelling social interactions in many 
disciplines (see examples in Ramkissoon et al (2013), Deutsch et al, (2013)). 
 
In this study, two SEM models, focusing on higher education and living 
conditions separately, are developed using the web-surveyed data sets 
described above. These models aim to analyse the causal relationships 
between the specific social factors, which contribute to the decision behavior of 
jiaoyuficated families and the social impacts of jiaoyufication.  There are eight 
hypotheses assumed for understanding the social process of jiaoyufication:  
H1-H4 for the path to living condition and H5-H8 for the path to higher education, 
which have been represented into Figure 3. 
 
In Figure 3 (on the left), higher education is related to the three social factors: 
senior high school, compulsory education and family background. In Figure 3 
(on the right), living condition is related to the three social factors: higher 
education, compulsory education and senior high school. These models will 
test the eight hypotheses (hypotheses H1-H4 on the left and H5-H8 on the right) 









Figure 3. Conceptual model of high-education (hypotheses from 1 to 4, right) 
and conceptual model of living condition(hypotheses from 5 to 8, left); figure 
devised by Jianquan Cheng and Qiyan Wu 
 
The Socio-spatial landscape of Jiaoyufication in Nanjing 
 
Jiaoyufied space production process  
 
The production of space in a jiaoyufied field involves not only institutional 
arrangements but also the significance of differential political entitlement to 
jiaoyufication (Richardson and Jensen, 2003), implying an uneven 
geographical development in the production of difference at various spatial 
scales (Harvey, 2005). This reflects three stages of resident-relocation based 
urban transition. The first stage takes the form of traditional gentrification (Smith, 
1979; Ley, 2003; Hammelt, 1991) whereby the jiaoyufiers displace blue collar 
workers through the real estate market and subsequently transform their 
neighborhoods as populated by a new generation of middle-class inhabitants 
(Bridge, 2001; Ley, 2003). For the lower class residents who accepted financial 
offers from these rich jiaoyufiers, this seemed like a ‘good deal’, and they were 
‘happily’ relocated. However, in agreeing to this practice, lower class families 
had to sacrifice opportunities for inter-generational cultural reproduction 
through education. In fulfilling their immediate needs for accommodation, they 
fell into the trap of social unsustainability, since these properties had been the 
only possession they had ever owned, apart from their labor. When asking one 
interviewee, a retired worker, about these apparent disadvantages, he replied 
with some disappointment, after a long silence,  
 
I ought to have bought a bigger space for the whole family…shouldn’t I?… 
12 
 
they [his grandchildren] are worker’s children, maybe not good at school  
 
This story echoes Willis’ (1977) assertion that the social reproduction of the 
working class exceeds divergences in fortune and power, as exemplified here 
where hopes for achieving social mobility through schooling are thwarted.  
 
Secondly, and as a consequence of the process by which jiaoyufiers bought 
the residences of blue-collar residents, the edu-apartment zones entered a 
stage of hybrid transition. During this period, most of the rest of the lower class 
inhabitants were progressively displaced by further jiaoyufiers in addition to 
which, those previous jiaoyufiers, whose children had come to the end of their 
secondary education, sold their properties and were replaced by newcomers of 
the same social status. An original inhabitant described the displacement 
process: 
 
We were workers in a boiler factory [that subsequently went bankrupt] 
before the reforms. We and our original neighbours [and co-workers] were 
all employed in the same danwei; they have nearly all moved out. As for 
our new neighbours, we hardly know them. They bought the flats here for 
schooling.  
 
The third stage is typified by the remainder of the lower class families departing 
these areas, as the process of gentrification fostered new forms of urban 
alienation, and as jiaoyufication zones became a type of middle-class urban 
enclave (Breitung, 2012; Wu et al., 2015) in which only a few blue-collar 
residents lingered, isolated from residents of a similar class. As an old blue-
collar-worker couple remarked:  
 
Our original neighbours [their co-workers in the same danwei] have nearly 
all moved out…. We know little about our new neighbours. 
 
Jiaoyufication-based Cultural Production Process  
 
Jiaoyufication demonstrates a distinctive process of stratification between 
jiaoyufiers and lower classes that is organized around pre-higher education and 
creates different modes of distributing cultural capital and reinforcing cultural 
class reproduction. Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) argue that social classes 
possess different cultural capital capacity, and contend that the education 
system has a particularly critical role in the (re)production of cultural capital. 
Accordingly, the differential accessibility to stratified education resources 
delineates the pathways of cultural production, and consequently changes the 
trajectory of social reproduction in class remaking (Sullivan, 2001; Andersen 
and Hansen, 2012). The web-survey conducted in Nanjing underlines how this 
educational stratification powerfully impacts on cultural production and social 
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class formation by differentiating standards of educational attainment between 
different social groups, thus echoing Nash’s (1990: 432) comments that ‘the 
school has become the most important agency for the reproduction of almost 
all social classes’. Grounding these abstract perspectives, an interviewee 
displayed a passion for using the edu-apartment to ensure his child could study 
in a good school. Here, a newly rich middle-class father emphasizes how 
education can demonstrate his recently acquired status despite the scorn of 
older middle-class groups:  
 
I know our [family’s] disadvantages in culture, although we have more 
money [than middle class, especially, intellectuals]… but my kids ought to 
learn more to be respected [by other middle class fractions]… I think we 
[rich but less educated families] deserved this [the purchase of an 
expansive edu-apartment] 
 
Certainly, jiaoyufication-based cultural production dynamics can be 
deconstructed to identify two successive paths or impacts of cultural 
stratification through the structural models in Figure 4. The NFI/CFI statistics 
calculated from models A and B are 0.970/0.98 and 0.977/0.997 respectively, 
which indicate the statistical significance of these models – measurement and 
structural models. 
 
In Figure 4 (model A), there are three latent constructs (higher education, 
compulsory education and family background) and nine observed variables. 
The first latent construct, compulsory education, is explained by three observed 
variables: primary school, junior high school and senior high school. The 
second latent construct (exogenous variable), family background, is explained 
by four measurable variables: Hukou of parents, father’s education background, 
mother’s education background and occupation of parents.  The third latent 
construct, higher education, is explained by two observed variables: degree and 
college. 
In Figure 4 (model B), there are also three latent constructs (r1-3) (higher 
education, compulsory education and living condition) and eight observed 
variables. The latent construct – living condition, is explained by three observed 
variables: housing, income and occupation. Other two latent constructs are 
explained by the same set of variables as model in Figure 4. The results of 







Figure 4. Results of the high-education structural models (Model A (left) and B 
(right); figure devised by Jianquan Cheng and Qiyan Wu 
 
 
(1) The impact of stratification in pre-higher education upon higher education 
attainment differentiation. 
 
The structural model of education in Fig 4 (model A) demonstrates that family 
status determines or influences educational stratification from primary 
education to higher education. Family background, as identified via the 
variables of the parents’ hukou, educational background and occupation, 
clearly has a significantly positive relationship with educational progress in the 
structural mode, in which the standardized path regression coefficient was 0.46. 
 
However, there is less direct impact of family status on higher educational 
segregation at a later stage, for the positive path coefficients have been 
dropped from 0.46 (on pre-higher education) down to 0.22 (on higher education 
stratification). Attainment here seems to rely more on individual ability and 
disposition to study rather than family background. Nevertheless, the data 
reveals that attendance at particular primary and junior secondary schools 
(indicated by the construct of Compulsory Education) has positive impacts on 
the senior secondary school (path coefficient is 0.52 in Fig 4 (model A) attended 
(indicated by the construct of Senior High School), which in turn has an 
important positive impact on higher education pathways (path coefficient is 
0.36). In fact, the pathway of cultural (re)production by which the rich can buy 
both access to good pre-higher education and indirect access to higher 
education for their children is much more effective than cultural acquisition 
through directly “investing” in their higher education, since strict university 
enrolment policies restrict such access. Thus, the pathway reveals the reasons 
for the battle of over limited jiaoyufication housing among new rich and 




Interestingly, similar evidence has been found by using the school registration 
system data of Arizona，USA, in 2015, and field survey and in-depth interviews 
of realtors, parents and students in Vancouver，Canada, in 2016, that rich locals 
or international immigrant families geographically concentrate in the catchment 
areas of ’good schools more than lower income residents, who register their 
children in randomly allocated schools of lower reputation.  Future research 
will ascertain whether education-led, territory-based jiaoyufication is an 
emergent global form of gentrification globally. 
 
(2) Higher education-led social stratification 
 
Certainly, in contrast to the primary education that has little impact on 
educational attainment, higher education stratification significantly influences 
the socio-economic status of the young generation (Sewell and Hauser, 1972). 
The structural model in Fig 4 (model B) shows that better attainment in higher 
education leads to choice of good residential location and occupation of 
expensive accommodation in later life. Higher education has a very high 
positive impact on living conditions as the path coefficient from the construct of 
higher education to that of living condition is very high 0.74, which in turn has a 
positive impact on occupation, income and housing – as indicated by their 
coefficients: 0.19, 0.60 and 0.48 respectively (Fig 4 –model B). Once families 
have purchased an edu-apartment, then they tend to ensure their new 
generations’ upward social mobility through educational attainment.    
 
Social-spatial meaning and the consequence of Jiaoyufication  
 
Class remaking through the production of Jiaoyufied space  
 
Jiaoyufication reveals that space has a pivotal role in shaping social 
reproduction (Giddens, 1984). The processes through which jiaoyufied space 
is (re)produced encourages the middle class to occupy it as a setting for social 
consolidation or social mobility. Accordingly, this jiaoyufied space is 
distinguished as a site of middle class remaking from other spaces, such as 
those within the catchment areas of non-key schools. Indeed, the institutional 
arrangements of educational zoning have lasted for nearly three decades since 
1986, when the Compulsory Education Law of 1986 was issued, continuously 
reproducing the conditions for jiaoyufiers’ cultural and social (re)production. 
Since such institutional arrangements change very slowly, tensions between 
middle class families over accessibility to schools intensify, provoking those 
who are unsuccessful in securing edu-apartments to argue with the education 
bureau, petition city governments or as a last resort, organize public 
demonstrations. Nevertheless, as Lefebvre (1991) emphasizes, space is a 
concrete abstraction of historically specific materials, concepts and daily 
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practices. Accordingly, no matter how the inhabitants of jiaoyufication zones 
respond to the adjustment of educational policies in quotidian practice, they 
occur within a space that has been (re)shaped by institutional arrangements. 
That is to say, the concrete quotidian practices of jiaoyufiers, such as 
purchasing and selling edu-apartments, schooling, and socializing with 
neighbors have emerged within the abstract political settings of (middle) class 
formation and control of class mobility.  
 
Jiaoyufied space and its (re)production anchors the geographical differentiation 
of educational arrangements through a complicated yet stabilizing and enduring 
path of regionalization (Giddens, 1984) that involves daily practices of cultural 
and social (re)production (Willis, 1981). In reality, jiaoyufication zoning at 
different stages is a spatial consequence of social contention between different 
social groups for limited high quality educational resources. An official who 
owned a danwei department of provincial educational department within a key 
school catchment area smirked: 
 
our neighborhood was out of the catchment of Lixue Primary School (in 
figure 1) at first, but [for emphasis] how could they [municipal education 
bureau who is in charge of zoning the catchment in each city] make such 
an oversight?… We [original residents] are employees of the provincial 
education department [municipal education bureau is under its 
supervision]!… Later, we [neighborhood] were [situated within the 
catchment of Lixue Primary School]…Sure, my work unit [provincial 
educational department] of course takes advantages of it [the zoning policy] 
to provide benefits for its employees  
 
On the other hand, an owner of a non-edu-apartment next to an edu-apartment 
zone criticized these arrangements:  
 
It [the zoning policy] is irrational,…inclined to favour the rich people and 
resource-controlling danwei,…they [the controlling-resource danwei and 
educational bureau] regulated it [educational zoning] but …is it right that 
the poor and work units cannot control these resources and only deserve a 
poor quality school? 
 
In this context of middle class formation, a jiaoyufied habitus contributes to the 
disparities between jiaoyufied places and non-jiaoyufication zones and 
consequently perpetrates cultural (re)production. That is to say, these forms of 
habitus have been embedded within the structuralized differentiation of 
educational resources by institutional arrangements and market forces from 
global to individual scales, and from national to local community contexts 
(Richardson and Jensen, 2003). The Chinese Communist Party’s practice of 
developing an elite education tradition since the 1950s, the emergence of 
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neoliberal educational reform on a national scale in the 1980s (Mok et al., 2009; 
Chan and Mok, 2001), and policies of introducing school fees (including 
‘Temporary Schooling Fee’, ’Choice Fee’ or ‘Increasing Enrollment Fee’) [note] 
have encouraged real estate agencies to transform the edu-apartment market 
since the early 2000.  
 
School fees demonstrate a close practical and theoretical relation to 
jiaoyufication, for paying for high quality education reflects how economic 
capital is superior to social/cultural capital acquisition, as Bourdieu（2011）
articulates. Undeniably, jiaoyufication clashes with the mooted association 
between neoliberal educational reform and the requirements for equalitarianism 
in the post-reform practice of China. However, jiaoyufication does temporally 
promote a varied social mix, although it will likely cause greater segregation in 
the long run. Consequently, we call for further research into urban strategies 
that aim to provide equal education rights amongst a wide range of social 
classes, as the US has endeavoured to achieve with regard to college 
admission among a variety of races. 
 
Jiaoyufied space has been manipulated to serve political strategies that govern 
educational capital distribution between social groups and classes. With 
reference to this, an official of the educational bureau commented:  
 
Since we lack enough [good educational resources] to distribute, [we] have 
to settle upon a solution to zoning edu-apartment… based on tradition…but 
it [the zoning policy] has been inevitably impacted by [powerful or resource-
controlling] work units... A person or danwei in a favorable position gains 
special advantages. 
 
Accordingly, by manipulating the governance of educational capital distribution, 
jiaoyufied space has become an expression of the state’s will, reflecting the 
interests of a dominant social elite group and resonating with the normative 
cultural desires of mainstream society. As such, it has inadvertently created a 
path-dependence of middle class social reproduction through cultural 
(re)production. Nevertheless, within the field of jiaoyufication, each individual 
jiaoyufier develops a habitus that combines with a set of collective dispositions 
(Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990; Bridge, 2001) in the process of class remaking. 
For instance, schoolchildren not only develop enhanced confidence and 
achieve better education attainment than their peers in common schools, but 
also belong to more prestigious social networks, as revealed in an interview 
with a parent: 
 
It [classmate, relationship in key schools] is also a treasure when they grow 
up…after all, guanxi [personal relations] is very important to Chinese 
society…[they are] children of government officials, professors, managers 
18 
 
and officers in army…  
 
In addition to the social networks forged between school children, their parents 
- from middle class elites with varied social backgrounds - also create high-level 
social networks. Both forms of network will undoubtedly help to upgrade the 
social and occupational mobility of these students. 
 
Furthermore, the ruling classes have sophisticatedly manipulated the jiaoyufied 
zones to divert and weaken the resistance of bottom-up public criticism, a 
cultural violence fatalistically referred to by a parent residing in a non-edu-
apartment:  
 
My family can’t afford such an edu-apartment… and I do not possess the 
necessary social relationships [personal connections]… and so I have to 
send [my child] to the Primary School on Hankou Road [a non-key school 
neighboring with the best key schools in Nanjing]… I can only hope that he 
studies hard to go to a good secondary school with a good grade. 
 
Narrowing the traditional path of bottom-up social mobility 
 
Bourdieu asserts that cultural capital may be conditionally converted into 
economic capital (2011). There has been a paradoxical relationship between 
education/cultural capital acquisition and social status expected in 
jiaoyufication for the following reasons. In the structural model shown in Fig 6, 
family background, as a latent construct, is indicated by four observed variables, 
among which the educational background (e.g. years of study) of parents is 
conceived as cultural capital, while the hukou of the parents and their 
occupations are expressions of social status.  
 
Here, we can elucidate these issues by referring to the models. 
 
Accordingly, the structural model demonstrates a positive causal relationship 
between the latent construct of family background and cultural capital and 
social status (Fig. 4 –model A). For instance, the standardized factor loading of 
cultural capital is higher than that of social status (0.84 and 0.77 for cultural 
capital in comparison to 0.53 and 0.46 for social status). It means that cultural 
capital makes more contributions to family background than social status. 
These effects could be created through either a direct way (i.e. family 
background) or an indirect way (following a clear pathway: from family 
background to compulsory education, to senior high school and eventually to 
higher education). Consequently, class formation, manifested as living 
condition (a latent construct indicated by the three observed variables: housing 
price, income, and the prestige of occupation in Fig 4 – model B), was strongly 
influenced by higher education and further affected by parents’ cultural capital 
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and social status, and family background, respectively. 
 
However, since the pivotal function of jiaoyufication has been to achieve access 
to high quality educational resources (from kindergarten to Grade 9) through 
the purchase of an edu-apartment, it is clear that the real estate market  is 
taking advantage of the demand for edu-apartments by inflating prices to a far 
higher level than before. Real estate companies compete to develop new 
residential buildings within the catchment areas of well-known key schools and 
sell them at a much higher price than those in neighboring areas. As an 
employee of a real estate agency frankly acknowledged, ‘we live on the 
commission of housing transaction… the higher price it is, the more commission 
fee we charge’. Such a strategy requires that these jiaoyufiers attain a higher 
level of economic capacity than previously.  
 
In fact, there are three pathways of inflating the housing price of jiaoyufication 
zones (Wu et al., 2016b). The most significant strategy adopted by owners in 
some neighborhoods is to keep the property and wait for potential regeneration, 
so that the new-built edu-apartment will provide owners, real estate agents and 
developers with a much higher reward. Yet while the average family income has 
increased by 25% per year, from 1995 to 2014 the cost of an edu-apartment 
has increased by 39% per year according to our survey, further restricting 
traditional opportunities for bottom-up social mobility.  While the acquisition of 
cultural capital might initially be a powerful asset in achieving upward social 
mobility, at this later stage of the jiaoyufication process, economic rather than 
already existing cultural capital is required in the remaking of middle class 
identity. Accordingly, the path of jiaoyufication is narrowed down by the 
restrictions imposed by the market, excluding less affluent intellectual families 
from conventional middle strata, and making new middle classes through 
“buying” cultural capital. 
 
 
This tendency thus somewhat suppresses intra-generational social mobility and 
exacerbates intergenerational mobility by narrowing the channels for bottom-
up social mobility that has been regarded as a traditional solution to releasing 
social class tensions. Traditionally, the lower class could achieve an 
intergeneration-based upward social mobility through educational attainment 
(Waters et al., 2010). As Bourdieu (1984) mentions, the logic of transformation 
between different forms of capital, for instance via prestige, wealth and power, 
foregrounds how economic capital is superior to cultural capital. Therefore, 
when the urban new rich are accepted by mainstream society through a cultural 
reproduction perpetrated via the narrowed path of jiaoyufication, it significantly 
transforms the social class structure from that characterized by a Weberian trio 
of wealth, power and authority to a neoliberal structure in which wealth and 
power predominate, with the consequent increase in social polarization and 
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spatial segregation.  
 
Beyond territorial tension: a Neoliberal social reproduction? 
 
Jiaoyufication is undoubtedly based on territorial competition over edu-
apartments within the catchment areas of key schools; however, the 
geographical tension among social groups inevitably devolves into a social 
struggle that exceeds space. As an outcome of urban educational resource 
distribution, jiaoyufication emerged with the neoliberal marketization of urban 
education reform in the late 1990s (Mok, et al., 2009), as scarce educational 
resources came to be regarded as a form of capitalized public goods that 
exemplified the motto of small governance and big market in Deng Xiaoping’s 
neoliberal regime (Wong, 2004; Harvey, 2005). Since then, the rich have been 
able to consolidate their social status by competitively bidding for the edu-
apartments that had access to key schools. This strategy not only curtails the 
tradition of meritocratic education and consolidates social hierarchy, but also 
expands geographical unevenness on an urban scale by enlarging the rent-gap 
through capitalizing institutional resources, further segregating the poor and 
rich (Wu et al, 2016b). The conflict involved in the process of jiaoyufication 
exceeds the territorial competition depicted from a conventional urban social 
ecology perspective in, the following two ways. 
 
First, jiaoyufication is a hybrid phenomenon of gentrification and urban 
educational segregation. Nevertheless, it also expresses the reproduction of 
middle class habitus through cultural and social reproduction (Bourdieu, 1984; 
Wu et al., forthcoming). As mentioned above, due to the creative-destructive 
strategy of jiaoyufication, the traditional Weberian intra/intergeneration-based 
stratified society with three structures shaped by wealth, power and prestige 
(Waters et al., 2010), are trimmed down into an intergeneration-based stratified 
society with dual structures, as wealth and power gradually come to dominate 
the social stratification of post-Mao China. Consequently, a distinctly 
neoliberalist social hierarchy is enhanced and the ruling class’s social control is 
reinforced by the cultural (re)production generated by jiaoyufication, through 
which the new rich of the reform era are gradually absorbed into the dominant 
classes. 
 
Second, jiaoyufication involves a particular Chinese revanchist urbanism. 
Revanchist urbanism initially refers to how gentrification constitutes a switch 
towards the reinvestment of economic capital and regeneration of inner city 
neighborhoods in contrast to previous processes of suburbanization in the 
western city (Smith, 1996). In China, this has been combined with a post-Maoist 
counterattack from those rich who were exiled from the social mainstream in 




In sum, the jiaoyufication process reflects a social-spatial transformation that is 
an integral part of the trajectory of neoliberal reform in the Chinese city. It is 
undeniable that jiaoyufication is partly shaped by culture-led and education-
driven processes of gentrification and territorial contestation among social 
classes, thus superficially seeming to be a transformation generated by a switch 
in cultural capital. However, more broadly, it is grounded in a globalized social 
transformation characterized by creative destruction as workers formerly living 
in danwei residences have been excluded from global social-production cycles 
and brutally expelled from the inner city (Sassen, 2014) during the economic 




Jiaoyufication has been driven by the institutional arrangements through which 
educational resources have been geographically redistributed (Wu et al, 2016b). 
However, as a form of gentrification in a Chinese context, its dynamic impacts 
on geography extend into social struggle and conflict. With respect to its cultural 
and economic capital-switching, and class displacement, jiaoyufication has 
emerged within a geographical process of education-driven cultural production 
and social reproduction. David Ley (2003) reveals how the cultural reproduction 
of young American professionals by renovating old inner neighborhoods in 
cities plays a pivotal role in distinguishing them from other suburban middle 
class groups. However, Chinese jiaoyufiers are far more concerned about how 
the educational capital of their offspring might maintain their intergenerational 
class identity. 
 
Following the trajectory from individual educational production to collective 
social reproduction, a dialectic relationship between spatial production and 
class remaking has been revealed. This socio-spatial process has 
demonstrated that the urban new rich have been absorbed into the dominant 
class, while the middle class have reproduced and the inner-city urban lower 
class have been displaced into marginal spaces. Moreover, fierce competition 
between the urban new rich, the traditional middle class and the upper lower 
class over the limited numbers of jiaoyufied edu-apartments within the 
catchments of key schools has produced a distinctive battlefield for social 
mobility and consolidation. 
 
Jiaoyufication has directly enhanced urban residential segregation and 
exacerbated social stratification (Zhou, et al., 1998) as the urban poor in edu-
apartment zones have been gradually displaced by jiaoyufiers, and key school 
catchments have become a sanctum of middle class remaking and realms for 
the social assimilation of the new urban rich. Although both gentrifiers and 
jiaoyufiers have displaced blue collar with white collar inhabitants in inner city 
areas, jiaoyufiers have been less concerned about housing renovation as a 
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means to distinguish themselves from others, as a parent admitted when talking 
about the flat she owned, 
 
This, my home? … You know, it’s small and old … It’s just to get into the 
primary school and No. 29 Junior Middle School and that’s all (Wu et al, 
2016b). 
 
Unlike other new inner city residents, jiaoyufiers are not particularly concerned 
by the local environment and the quality of properties since they only stay for a 
short period. And in contrast to Western gentrifiers, jiaoyufiers are more 
concerned with the acquisition of cultural capital and its transmission to their 
children to underpin class (re)production, and less focused upon achieving 
cultural differentiation solely in the educational field (Bridge, 2001). As an 
extended form of gentrification, jiaoyufication may thus be understood as the 
outcome of a distinctive form of revanchist urbanism in China. 
 
Furthermore, jiaoyufication has narrowed the traditional path of bottom-up 
social mobility and enlarged social polarization in the three decades of post-
Mao neoliberal reform. With the emergence of a dual structure in which only 
wealth and power are significant, traditionally important social groups such as 
scholars, farmers, artisans and merchants have become internally segregated 
as wealth and power is increasingly wielded by the emergent classes, while 
others descend into the lower classes and become increasingly marginalized. 
This transition not only further weakens the role of cultural/social capital in 
facilitating social mobility, but also changes the functions of place. For example, 
edu-apartments in jiaoyufied neighborhoods have become highly mobile 
‘taverns’, sites of elective-belonging rather than a longstanding homes or 
embedded in a local place-identity. 
 
This research also underpins the spatial fix identified by Marxists (Harvey, 1981) 
as the distribution of educational resources has been transformed from being 
based on social hierarchy to becoming territorially configured (Wu et al., 2015). 
In this case, jiaoyufication has unintendedly readjusted and reshaped the 
spatial fix, but more crucially, destructive cultural and social (re)production has 
created a tense new spatial arena for middle class remaking in a broader 
context of neoliberal socio-economic restructuring.  
 
Note: Based on the “Temporary Act of Management of Obligational Education 
Schools, Secondary School and College’s Charge” issued in 1996. The State 
Education Commission, State Development Planning Commission and Ministry 
of Finance and other related departments admitted the incidental expense paid 
by students at the compulsory education stage. These included a “Temporary 
Schooling Fee” paid by students who temporarily study in a region in which their 
permanent residence is not registered, a “Choice Fee” paid by students who 
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choose a school zone in which they are registered to study by hukou 
registration, or an “Increase Enrollment Fee” paid by students who are enrolled 
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